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Optimal Magnitude & Probability of Fines when Courts Dislike Punishment

  • By Nuno Garoupa
  • 1 Year ago
  • Downloads: 2

  • View: 1023

Volume I 2018 Issue I 2018 GNLU Journal of Law And Economics

The proposition that crime rates respond to risks and benefits is called the deterrence hypothesisin the economic literature. It asserts that individuals respond significantly to the incentives createdby the criminal justice system. If so, increasing the resources that society devotes to the arrest,prosecution, conviction, and punishment of criminals will reduce the amount and social cost ofcrime.


Recommended Citation

Nuno Garoupa (2025) "Optimal Magnitude & Probability of Fines when Courts Dislike Punishment ", GNLU Journal of Law And Economics : Volume I 2018, Issue I 2018
Available at: https://gnlu.ac.in/GJLE/Publications/Optimal Magnitude & Probability of Fines when Courts Dislike Punishment

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